Ḥeleḳ rishon. Maʼamre musar, daʻat ṿe-yirʼat H. lefi seder parashiyot ha-Torah -- ḥeleḳ sheni. ʻIyunim be-musar ṿe-yirʼat H., pirḳe maḥshavot, maʼamre musar, maʻarakhot ha-teshuvah, shevive or.

Tobacco consumption is believed to be one of the world’s greatest preventable health problems. According to the World Health Organisation, 1.1 billion people worldwide are addicted to nicotine with tobacco causing an estimated four million premature deaths every year. The development of a nicotine conjugate vaccine suggests that immunisation may hold promise as a future therapeutic and preventive strategy for tobacco smoking and nicotine addiction. Allowing parents to immunise their children against smoking could be an infringement of children’s right to (...) an open future, however, and is not ethically unproblematic. (shrink)

Background: Priority setting is necessary in current healthcare services. Discussion of fair process has highlighted the value of developing reasons for allocation decisions on the basis of experience gained from real cases.Aim: To identify the reasons that those with experience of real decision-making concerning resource allocation think relevant in deciding on the priority of a new but expensive drug treatment.Methods: Semistructured interviews with members of committees with responsibility for making resource allocation decisions at a local level in the British National (...) Health Service, analysed using modified grounded theory.Results: 22 interviews were carried out. 14 reasons were identified. Four reasons were almost universally considered most important: cost effectiveness; clinical effectiveness; equality and gross cost. No one reason was considered dominant. Some considerations, such as political directives and fear of litigation, were thought by many participants to distort decision-making. There was a substantial lack of agreement over the relevance of some reasons, such as the absence of alternative treatment for the condition.Conclusions: There is a clear consensus on the importance and role of a limited number of reasons in allocation decisions among participants. A focus on the process of decision-making, however, does not obviate the need for those involved in the process to engage with problematical ethical issues, nor for the importance of further ethical analysis. (shrink)

מנושאי הספר: האדם ויוצרו, האדם והחברה, האדם וחייו.

Norman Daniels' and James Sabin's theory of “accountability for reasonableness” (A4R) is a much discussed account of due process for decision-making on health care priority setting. Central to the theory is the acceptance that people may justifiably disagree on what reasons it is relevant to consider when priorities are made, but that there is a core set of reasons, that all centre on fairness, on which there will be no disagreement. A4R is designed as an institutional decision process which will (...) ensure that only those reasons which everybody will agree are relevant and appropriate form part of decision-making. The argument which we will put forward in this paper questions whether it is a simple matter to delineate the core set of reasons and claims that it is a potential problem in A4R that it does not provide an indication of the exact content of this process. The paper first briefly outlines the content of A4R. It is argued that disagreement on what services should be high priorities cannot be resolved solely with a reference to “due process.” In order to retain consistency over time, decision-makers are required to agree and articulate what reasons qualify as relevant and how conflicting reasons are to be balanced in the course of the process. The second and main part of the paper then considers how the reason of “solidarity” can be handled within the A4R framework, and it is shown that deciding whether solidarity should be admitted to the core set of allowable reasons is not a simple matter. (shrink)

abstract The argument that scarce health care resources should be distributed so that patients in ‘need’ are given priority for treatment is rarely contested. In this paper, we argue that if need is to play a significant role in distributive decisions it is crucial that what is meant by need can be precisely articulated. Following a discussion of the general features of health care need, we propose three principal interpretations of need, each of which focuses on separate intuitions. Although this (...) account may not be a completely exhaustive reflection of what people mean when they refer to need, the three interpretations provide a starting‐point for further debate of what the concept means in its specific application. We discuss combined interpretations, the meaning of grading needs, and compare needs‐based priority setting to social welfare maximisation. (shrink)

ḥeleḳ 1. - Elul, Tishre - Adar -- ḥeleḳ 2. Nisan-Av.

ḥeleḳ 1. - Elul, Tishre - Adar -- ḥeleḳ 2. Nisan-Av.

On June 3, 2003, the European Council of health ministers rejected a proposal from the European Commission to allow drug manufacturers to advertise directly to particular groups of patients; the proposal had already been rejected by the European Parliament subsequent to a heated public debate in which consumer and patient groups almost unanimously argued that it was not the role of drug companies to provide information to patients. The pilot scheme suggested by the Commission would only have applied to patients (...) with three chronic diseases, AIDS, diabetes, and asthma, and would, it was argued, not undermine an overall ban. Drug companies would have been required to abide by a special code of conduct and clear any information given to patients—on web sites or in specialized publications—with national authorities. (shrink)

In this paper I review empirical methods applied in recent analysis of decision-making on priorities in health care. I outline a number of discrete methods and discuss their applicability and efficacy in the field of bioethics. Three key methodological issues seem to be important: choice of subject group; choice of approach and the extent of background information given to respondents. I conclude that a combination method is needed to give a comprehensive representation of values in priority setting and thus to (...) meet the overall objectives of empirical ethics. (shrink)

A principle claiming equal entitlement to continued life has been strongly defended in the literature as a fundamental social value. We refer to this principle as ‘equal value of life'. In this paper we argue that there is a general incompatibility between the equal value of life principle and the weak Pareto principle and provide proof of this under mild structural assumptions. Moreover we demonstrate that a weaker, age-dependent version of the equal value of life principle is also incompatible with (...) the weak Pareto principle. However, both principles can be satisfied if transitivity of social preference is relaxed to quasi-transitivity. Footnotes1 The authors are grateful to Luc Bovens, Kristian Schultz Hansen, Søren Holm, Franz Huber, Wiebke Kuklys, Gabriella Pigozzi, and two anonymous referees for detailed and very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any errors and shortcomings are the responsibility of the authors alone. (shrink)

Avraham Yitzhaq Ha-Cohen Kook (1865-1935) stands as a colossal figure of modern Jewish history and thought. Jurist, mystic, poet, theologian, communal leader, founder of the modern Chief Rabbinate and still the defining thinker of Religious Zionism, he is indispensable for understanding modern Jewish thought, the contemporary State of Israel, and the most fundamental interactions of religion, nationalism, ethics and spirituality. Despite countless studies of him, almost no full-fledged intellectual biography of him exists in any language. This study of the years (...) before his momentous move to Jaffa in 1904, drawing on little-known works, including recently published manuscripts, begins to fill that gap. It traces his life and times in the remarkably intense Rabbinic intellectual milieu of late nineteenth-century Eastern Europe, and his path from a profound, regularly rationalist traditionalism, towards a dynamic theology and spiritual practice weaving together Kabbalah, philosophy, universal ethics, and romantic mysticism. (shrink)

Avraham Yitzhaq Ha-Cohen Kook (1865-1935) stands as a colossal figure of modern Jewish history and thought. Jurist, mystic, poet, theologian, communal leader, founder of the modern Chief Rabbinate and still the defining thinker of Religious Zionism, he is indispensable for understanding modern Jewish thought, the contemporary State of Israel, and the most fundamental interactions of religion, nationalism, ethics and spirituality. Despite countless studies of him, almost no full-fledged intellectual biography of him exists in any language. This study of the years (...) before his momentous move to Jaffa in 1904, drawing on little-known works, including recently published manuscripts, begins to fill that gap. It traces his life and times in the remarkably intense Rabbinic intellectual milieu of late nineteenth-century Eastern Europe, and his path from a profound, regularly rationalist traditionalism, towards a dynamic theology and spiritual practice weaving together Kabbalah, philosophy, universal ethics, and romantic mysticism. (shrink)

ha-Derekh la-ʻaliyah -- Bi-shevile ha-ʻavodah -- Dorshe H.

First Published in 1984. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Some aspects of the problem of measurement in quantum theory are treated. We stress that the problem is both physical and conceptual, that the physical problem has been solved and the conceptual one is inherent in quantum theory. We also deal with some remarks made by Wigner concerning physics and the explanation of life, and present alternative positions on the mind-matter relationship within a deterministic framework, as we see them.

In a Recent article [9], Alexander Rosenberg attacks the “manipulative” view of causation as being unilluminating and as being beset with difficulties. As a proponent of that view [3], I have felt it necessary to take up cudgels in its defence.Rosenberg's criticisms are directed at Gasking's version of this view [5]. Gasking's recipe for causation is, “one says ‘A causes B’ in cases where one could produce an event of the A sort as a means to producing one of the (...) B sort”. Here it is taken for granted that we have general manipulative techniques for producing events of the A sort and that this is implicitly assumed when one speaks of A as a cause. There is one qualification to this formula for causes which arises from the necessity for individuating processes, namely, that, for A to be the cause of B, it must not always lead to B, but only in special cases. (shrink)

Is the Copenhagen interpretation really a subjective one? What is the special role that observations play in quantum theory? Is there really something peculiar about the projection postulate? Why does the Copenhagenist treat probabilities as properties of individual systems? Is there a measurement problem, and if so, can itin principle be solved within the framework of quantum theory? We offer aconceptual treatment of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics in which these questions are answered and contrast it with another interpretation (...) which we call Popperism. The interpretations differ in their choice of a state description, from which it follows that they will offer a different account of the relation of measurements to states and different ways of describing quantum theory. But the two descriptions are equally consistent and physically completely equivalent. (shrink)

We consider the mind-dependence or independence of the "now," of "becoming," and of "time's arrow," by considering the various senses in which these notions might be mind-dependent or not. These matters cannot be sensibly discussed without taking a stand regarding criteria of "reality." Proceeding from a basically phenomenalist position we conclude that merely to differentiate between appearance and reality is implicitly to assume a directed flow of time. We discuss the relationship between phenomenological and physical time and their possible asymmetries. (...) We find that physical time acquires meaning only through phenomenological time, and that phenomenological time is fundamentally asymmetric. This still leaves room for the question: Is there anything in physical time which reflects the fact that it, to be meaningful, must be applied asymmetrically? The relevance of relativity theory to this question is discussed. (shrink)

ḥeleḳ 1. Ḳunṭres ha-bayit -- ḥeleḳ 2. Ḥeleḳ ha-ʻaliyah --.

We rebut the objections to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics presented by Park [9,10], Margenau [10], and Popper [11]. It seems to us that these authors, having adopted different interpretations of quantum mechanics, have been unable to grasp the perspective of the Copenhagenist. They therefore miss the points which the Copenhagenist is making when he: accords a special status to observations in quantum theory; attributes a state vector to an individual system; places restrictions on the simultaneous measurability of non-commuting (...) observables; hesitates to use his measurements for retrodictions. In our opinion, the arguments of the above authors reflect their incomprehension of Copenhagenism. Elsewhere [5,6] we have discussed two alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics which we have called Copenhagenism and Popperism. We have there shown how the dispute between the schools stems from disparate uses of the word ‘state’. We continue the discussion here within the context of the above points and show how these disparate notions of state are related to diverse notions of ‘behaviour’. (shrink)

Nanomedicine offers remarkable options for new therapeutic avenues. As methods in nanomedicine advance, ethical questions conjunctly arise. Nanomedicine is an exceptional niche in several aspects as it reflects risks and uncertainties not encountered in other areas of medical research or practice. Nanomedicine partially overlaps, partially interlocks and partially exceeds other medical disciplines. Some interpreters agree that advances in nanotechnology may pose varied ethical challenges, whilst others argue that these challenges are not new and that nanotechnology basically echoes recurrent bioethical dilemmas. (...) The purpose of this article is to discuss some of the ethical issues related to nanomedicine and to reflect on the question whether nanomedicine generates ethical challenges of new and unique nature. Such a determination should have implications on regulatory processes and professional conducts and protocols in the future. (shrink)